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Abstract
We describe the electoral history of one of Europe’s most successful party families
over the past 100 years in 31 countries. With a unique and newly collected dataset
of national election results, and a large number of economic and social variables mea-
sured for each country-election observation, we find that two main factors drive the
electoral performance of social democratic parties: public sector spending, and the size
of the manufacturing sector. Our findings suggest that most of the fall in support for
social democratic parties in recent years is correlated with a decline in the number of
industrial workers as well as a reduction in the propensity of social democratic parties’
core supporters (industrial workers and public sector employees) to vote for them.
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1 Introduction
There is a large body of research on the rise of populist parties (e.g. Colantone and Stanig
2018; Dinas et al. 2019; Guiso et al. 2019; Kriesi et al. 2012; Kaltwasser et al. 2017; Eatwell
and Goodwin 2018). Less attention has been paid to a corollary of this trend: the electoral
decline of the centre left. Across Europe, social democratic parties that once commanded over
40 percent of votes have collapsed to the low twenties, teens, or lower. We do three things to
investigate these patterns. First, we describe the variations in support for social democrats
over the last century in 31 countries. Second, we undertake a time-series cross-sectional
analysis to identify some of the correlates of the electoral fortunes of social democrats.
Third, we supplement this aggregate-level analysis by looking at individual-level support for
social democratic parties between 2002 and 2016.
Our aim is not to provide a causal explanation of the rise and fall of social democracy. By
introducing a new dataset of elections for 31 countries over 100 years, we provide descriptive
evidence of a time-consistent relationship between two main factors, public sector spending
and industrial production, and votes for social democratic parties. Our findings suggest that
most of the fall in support for social democrats is correlated with a decline in the number of
industrial workers as well as a reduction in the propensity of these parties’ core supporters
(industrial workers and public sector employees) to vote for them.
2 Evolution of Social Democracy
There has been extensive work on the evolution of social democratic parties. For example,
scholars have looked at their formation (e.g. Sassoon 1996; Bartolini 2000), the strategic
challenge of appealing to the middle class while maintaining working class support (e.g.
Przeworski and Sprague 1986), the rise of a social dimension cross-cutting the traditional
left-right (e.g. Kitschelt 1990), how electoral systems shape their behaviour (e.g. Iversen and
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Soskice 2006), and globalization (e.g. Garrett 1998; Boix 1985). We include all the factors
discussed in this literature and we complement them with a wide range of other variables,
such as public spending, welfare spending, employment in industry, and electoral turnout.
We analyze all democratic elections in Europe over 100 years, starting from 1918. Many
European countries extended suffrage at the end of WWI. We define democratic elections as
all elections that were held in a year when a country had either a Polity score or a ‘Political
Competition’ score greater than 5.1 We count countries that had populations larger than
500,000 in 2017 and who had democratic elections for at least one 20-year period. These
criteria produce 579 elections in 31 countries, as Table 1 shows.
Table 1: Democratic elections in Europe, 1918 - 2017
1See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.
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Which parties do we count as social democratic? Usually, only one party was a member of
the Socialist International or Party of European Socialists at a particular time. For the cases
where several parties were members of these organizations, we combined the vote-shares for
these parties − see Appendix Table A1. Parties with different ideological origins at different
stages have been described as social democratic, such as the Italian Communist Party (PCI)
since the late 1960s. We run two robustness tests to address this issue. First, we estimate the
models with the vote-share of all left parties as the dependent variable (social democratic,
communist, and green). Second, because of the particular case of Italy, we estimate the
models counting the PCI rather than the PSI as the social democratic party in Italy from
1968 onwards, since after that year the PCI became more moderate, the PSI remained in
government with the centre right, and the PCI was the main opposition. We put together
the data on vote shares from Nohlen and Stoever (2010), and cross-checked the data with
national electoral commissions where possible.
Figure 1: Three measures of the electoral performance of social democratic parties
Note: Total share of votes = total votes for social democratic parties in a year in the 31 countries divided by total votes cast
in all elections. Total share of the electorate = total votes for social democratic parties in a year in the 31 countries divided by
total eligible voters in an election. Average share of votes = average share of votes for social democratic parties in a year in
each of the 31 countries.
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Figure 1 exemplifies the breadth of this dataset and shows three measures of social
democratic parties’ electoral performance. Measured by the average vote share (percent)
across our countries in a given year, support for social democrats peaked in the 1950s.
Measured by the total share of votes across Europe, support for these parties peaked in the
late 1990s, because of the high performance of social democrats in several larger countries
(Germany, UK, and Italy). Measured by the total share of the electorate, support for social
democrats declined in the late 1980s and fell precipitously in the 2000s (Figures A1-A2).
One issue is that social democracy has meant different things in different periods. The
main stages of the evolution of social democracy can be summarized as three ‘waves’. Figure
2 shows the periodization of these waves. Here, we coded each party by looking at their
positions in manifestos (for the post-1945 period), as well as historical descriptions (for
the pre-1945 period) (Jacobs 1989; von Beyme 1985; Sassoon 1996; Bartolini 2000). The
first wave, of a parliamentary road to socialism, started after the WWI, when most social
democratic parties broke from revolutionary politics and aimed to achieve socialism via a
parliamentary route, sometimes blending parliamentary and revolutionary objectives. With
the rise of industrial society, many expected these parties to win electoral majorities (cf.
Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Indeed, social democrats won over 30 percent of the vote
in some of the first elections after WWI (in Germany and Austria). In the mid-1920s,
the Swedish and Austrian parties exceeded 40 percent, while the Belgian party reached 39
percent. The 1920s and 1930s also saw brief periods in government for social democrats in
Czechoslovakia, Germany, France, the UK, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, most often in
coalition or tolerated by other parties. When in government, social democrat-led reforms
included maximum working hours, paid annual leave, collective bargaining, and pensions
systems. But, in this period, not all workers supported socialist parties, as some supported
Catholic or communist parties. Meanwhile, the social democrat electorate also included
agricultural workers and some middle class supporters (Neisse 1930; Lipset 1983). These
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early successes ended with the Great Depression. Democracy collapsed in most of central
and eastern Europe while support for social democrats fell in western Europe. There were
some exceptions, as social democrats achieved 38 percent in the UK, over 40 percent in
Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland, and a historic peak of 29 percent in Switzerland.
Figure 2: Three waves of social democracy
The second wave of social democracy involved the transformation of the parties into
mainstream electoral machines. After WWII, most social democratic parties attempted to
reach beyond their traditional working class base (e.g. Kirchheimer 1966), accepting that
social democrat voting industrial workers were unlikely to generate a majority (Sassoon
1996, p.42). This new strategy started in Scandinavia in the 1930s, then spread to social
democratic parties in the UK, France, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands in the 1940s,
and to Germany, Italy and Switzerland in the 1950s. These ‘catch-all’ parties downgraded
class-based politics, in favour of policies that appealed to public sector employees, urban pro-
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fessionals, and agricultural labour. Many social democrats focused on establishing a social
market (an objective shared with Christian democrats), building a welfare state, nation-
alizing natural monopolies, macroeconomic demand management, and in later yearsliberal
social policies on divorce and gender equality. Universal welfare policies also shifted the
preferences of sections of the middle class as well as centre right parties (e.g. Gingrich and
Häusermann 2015). These shifts enabled social democrats to form governments with liber-
als and Christian democrats, and in the immediate post-war years social democrats were
in government almost everywhere and in single-party governments in the UK, Sweden, and
Norway. Most social democratic parties saw their support peak in the 1960s and 1970s,
although whether this success was a result of societal changes or moderating party positions
cannot be identified with our data.
Following the 1970s oil crisis, changes in global trade patterns and rising unemployment
and inflation, market liberalization, and monetarist economics gained momentum, while
green movements also squeezed support. European integration, globalization, and the col-
lapse of communism facilitated a renewal of social democracy (e.g. Garrett 1998; Boix 1985).
A third wave of social democracy emerged around the idea of a third way or new middle (neue
mitte), which emphasized regulating markets, supply-side economic management, balanced
budgets, and social liberalism and environmentalism (e.g. Giddens 1998). By 1998, social
democrats were back in office in every western European country except Spain, Norway,
and Ireland; governing alone in the UK, Portugal, Sweden, and Greece, leading coalitions in
Germany, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, and France, and serving in grand coalitions with
the centre right in Austria, Belgium, Finland, and Switzerland. Also, in central and eastern
Europe, former communist leaders used third way social democracy to distance themselves
from the past, and emerged as electoral winners except in Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, and
Slovakia.
But, starting in the early 2000s, social democrat support collapsed almost everywhere.
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Between 2000 and 2017 most social democratic parties secured their lowest levels of support
since 1918, or 1945 for the post-war democracies, or 1989 for the new democracies in central
and eastern Europe.2
This suggests that different factors shaped the success of social democratic parties in
different periods. In the interwar period, the parties emerged from industrial labour, became
more moderate in the postwar period as they expanded support to public sector workers,
then adapted their positions following globalization in the 1970s, and faced new challenges
following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Great Recession in the 2000s. To
investigate this story we look at each of these periods in turn. Empirically, this periodization
also fits the availability of data for some key variables. For the interwar period, we found
data on manufacturing and public spending, but data on party positions are not available
until after WWII, while data on employment in industry and globalization only start in the
1970s. In the empirical analysis we test that our results are not driven by the choice of our
periodization, by estimating the models starting 5 years before and after our cutoff years.
3 Correlates of Electoral Support for Social Demo-
cratic Parties
To understand what factors correlate with these cross-country and cross-time variations
we collected a wide range of institutional, economic, social, and political variables. The
Appendix contains a full list of variables.
We estimate two different types of time-series cross-sectional models:
Vit = α+ βWit + φXit + γi + θt + ǫit (1)
2Few countries bucked this trend. This was the case in Albania, Croatia, Denmark, Portugal, Romania,
Spain, and the UK.
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∆Vit = α+ β∆Wit + φ∆Xit + γi + θt + ǫit (2)
Model 1 uncovers long-term changes in the levels of support for social democratic parties,
while model 2 (a first-differences model) examines short-term changes, between elections. In
the equations, V is a social democratic party percent vote share in country i at time (election)
t; α is a constant; W is a vector of independent variables; X is a vector of control variables; γ
are country fixed-effects; θ are decade fixed-effects and country-specific time trends; β, and φ
are the parameters to be estimated; and ǫ is the error term. We estimate both types of models
with ordinary least squares. This historical longitudinal cross-sectional analysis allows us
to tackle such a large and important question. However, it poses a trade-off. Although
conditional on a large set of controls and fixed-effects our exercize remains descriptive as
this type of time series analysis poses several empirical challenges such as omitted variable
bias, unit roots, and time trends interferences. We address some of these issues later.
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Figure 3: Public spending and industrial production in Western Europe
Note: For 18 western European countries, the graph plots measures of public spending as a percent of GDP and our three
measures of industry: the manufacturing index, for 1918-1939 (from League of Nations trade data, measuring the volume of
trade in manufactured goods relative to 1953); industry as a percent of GDP, for 1950-2017 (share of industrial output as a
percent of GDP at constant 2005 prices); and percent of total employment in industry, for 1970-2017. The lines are plotted by
locally weighted scatterplot smoothing.
As a start, Figure 3 plots two main independent variables (for 18 western European
democracies): public spending as a percent of GDP, and several measures of the size of
industry/manufacturing. Public spending increased steadily from the 1920s to the 2000s,
consistent with Wagner’s (1890) law on developed economies that embark on social progress.3
Industrial production rose until the 1970s and then declined dramatically, as a result of
structural changes, globalization and technology.
To investigate these relationships further, Table 2 presents the correlates of social demo-
cratic party vote shares between 1918 and 1939 for the 16 countries who held democratic
elections in this period and with the limited set of available variables. Trade in manufactured
3Peacock and Wiseman (1961) find consistent growth in public expenditure when Labour held office.
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Table 2: Correlates of social democracy party vote shares, 1918-1939
Analysis of levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public spending (% of GDP) -0.101 -0.0236 -0.184 0.129 -0.00593 0.109
(0.157) (0.140) (0.443) (0.337) (0.433) (0.368)
District magnitude (log) -2.344 -3.327 3.597* 6.259*** 3.731 5.130*
(5.917) (7.156) (1.727) (1.583) (2.299) (2.411)
SD party in gov’t (single-party) -1.108 -1.955 0.238 -0.199 0.355 0.0831
(2.035) (2.049) (2.311) (2.034) (1.975) (1.897)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-PM) 0.535 0.529 1.424 2.556* 0.360 1.294
(3.818) (2.706) (1.512) (1.334) (1.904) (1.811)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-junior) -0.462 -2.097 -8.349*** -8.993*** -9.563*** -9.544***
(3.600) (2.596) (2.382) (2.030) (2.229) (2.084)
Turnout 0.273* 0.194 0.198 0.0348 0.0291 -0.00804
(0.141) (0.164) (0.185) (0.159) (0.212) (0.200)
Manufacturing index 0.260** 0.181
(0.0925) (0.171)
Observations 77 77 49 49 49 49
R-squared 0.234 0.329 0.277 0.428 0.454 0.482
Number of countries 16 16 11 11 11 11
Analysis of differences
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Public spending (% of GDP) -0.0487 -0.0589 0.0642 0.0940 0.448 0.431
(0.144) (0.149) (0.171) (0.175) (0.534) (0.476)
District magnitude (log) -2.339 -0.918 -3.679 0.435 5.751 6.450
(9.189) (7.545) (8.628) (5.080) (4.596) (5.372)
SD party in gov’t (single-party) -1.987*** -1.869** -2.017** -1.532 -2.381** -2.049**
(0.661) (0.730) (0.748) (0.876) (0.804) (0.812)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-PM) -0.853 -0.316 -1.604 -0.461 -1.576 0.302
(1.531) (2.159) (1.909) (3.097) (1.618) (2.868)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-junior) -2.447* -2.848** -8.183* -11.32 -7.460 -6.974
(1.178) (1.075) (4.466) (7.528) (4.717) (4.475)
Turnout -0.125 -0.128 -0.139 -0.179 -0.318 -0.336
(0.312) (0.307) (0.470) (0.477) (0.384) (0.415)
Manufacturing index 0.0307 -0.0251
(0.118) (0.140)
Observations 61 61 38 38 38 38
R-squared 0.063 0.077 0.107 0.163 0.214 0.247
Number of countries 15 15 10 10 10 10
Country fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year time trends No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1 to 6 estimate effects on the overall level of support for
social democratic parties. Models 7 to 12 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). From Model 3, the
sample composed by the sub-set of countries for which the manufacturing index is available. Manufacturing Index available
for: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
goods in this early period is strongly correlated with votes for social democratic parties. We
do not find evidence that public spending was related to support for social democrats in this
period. Together, these findings are consistent with the description of wave 1 social demo-
cratic parties, who based their support on industrial labour. Third, when these parties made
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it into government, they generally lost support, whether as a single party of government or
as a senior or junior coalition partner. This result is consistent for all the periods we look
at.
Table 3: Correlates of social democracy party vote shares, 1945-2017
Analysis of levels Analysis of differences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Spending (% of GDP) 0.157** 0.193*** 0.168** 0.163**
(0.0577) (0.0586) (0.0725) (0.0729)
Social Democrat left-right position 0.172** 0.170* 0.148** 0.150**
(0.0812) (0.0839) (0.0684) (0.0687)
Centre Right left-right position -0.00290 -0.00343 -0.0357 -0.0357
(0.0358) (0.0346) (0.0299) (0.0297)
District magnitude (log) 0.574 0.787 0.948 0.912
(1.292) (1.308) (1.596) (1.581)
District mag.*SD left-right position -0.0576* -0.0552* -0.0614** -0.0619**
(0.0298) (0.0316) (0.0265) (0.0266)
SD party in gov’t (single-party) 1.335 1.097 -3.175*** -3.187***
(1.256) (1.230) (0.957) (0.962)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-PM) 0.976 0.634 -2.507** -2.506**
(1.327) (1.285) (0.963) (0.966)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-junior) -2.849*** -3.056*** -2.461*** -2.451***
(0.912) (0.925) (0.721) (0.721)
Turnout -0.0839 -0.0861 0.300** 0.299**
(0.106) (0.101) (0.130) (0.129)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year time trends No Yes No Yes
Observations 381 381 353 353
R-squared 0.162 0.176 0.169 0.170
Number of countries 31 31 31 31
Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1 and 2 estimate effects on the overall level of support
for social democratic parties. Models 3 and 4 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). Controls: GDP
per capita (log), GDP growth, EU member, Eurozone member, presidential system. Full results in Appendix Table A3.
Table 3 presents the correlates of social democratic party vote shares between 1945 and
2017. Because of data availability we add several economic control variables as well as some
key political variables, in particular the left-right locations of social democratic and centre
right parties (from party manifestos), as well as the interaction of left-right party positions
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and the electoral system. We include the policy positions of centre right parties as these were
the main competitors for social democratic parties in most countries. We accept that the
positions of other parties are also relevant, particularly for the decline of social democratic
parties in more recent periods.
Several results are worth highlighting. First, public spending after 1945 is positively
related to support for social democratic parties, and this result holds both for the long-term
trends as well as for short-term (between election) changes. The effect is sizeable too: a one
standard deviation increase in public spending is associated with an increase of about 1.5%
in vote share for social democratic parties. What we do not know from this result, though,
is whether more public spending leads to more support for social democrats or whether a
larger public sector means more workers with an interest in voting social democrat.4
Second, regarding party positions, we find evidence that social democratic parties gained
votes when they moved to the centre (closer to the median voter) and lost votes when they
moved to the left. We do not find an effect of the left-right position of the main centre
right competitor on social democratic support. We replicated this analysis breaking the
left-right down into separate economic and social dimensions − see Appendix Table A6
− and we found that social democratic parties won more votes when they were more free
market on the economic dimension but more conservative on the social dimension. These
results challenge some existing research, for example, that there is little evidence of the link
between parties’ positions and their electoral performance (e.g. Adams 2012), and Kitschelt ’s
(1990) contention that social democrats should gain support as they become left-libertarian.
However, further investigation reveals that this result on the social dimension is mainly
driven by parties in Eastern Europe (after 1989), where several parties, in Romania and
Slovakia for example, became socially conservative from the early 2000s and gained votes
at the expense of more liberal-cosmopolitan parties. In contrast, there is little evidence
4We know that public spending can also rise when social democrats are not in office (Borooah 1987).
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in western Europe of a connection between social democratic parties’ positions on a social
dimension and their electoral performance.
We also find that the electoral effect of social democratic parties’ positions is magnified by
the electoral system. We find an interaction between the electoral system and the left-right
position of a party, such that the larger the district magnitude, the lower the support for a
social democratic party as the party moves rightwards. Intuitively, this is consistent with
existing theory (e.g. Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Iversen and Soskice 2006), which high-
lights the threat of being outflanked by more left-wing parties in countries with proportional
electoral systems. So, in higher district magnitude (proportional) electoral systems, social
democratic parties lost support as they become more centrist whereas in lower magnitude
(majoritarian) systems, they gained support as they moved towards the median voter.
Table 4 presents the results for the era of globalization, after 1975. Data availability
enables us to add a number of new control variables. In particular, we include a globalization
index, which combined 43 economic, social, and political variables, such as net and total trade
volume, net immigration and total foreign born population, technological integration, and
so on (Dreher 2006; Gygli et al. 2019). We also now include welfare spending as a percent
of GDP. This allows us to look at public spending on redistribution as opposed to total
public spending, which also includes public employment. As before, we find a statistically
significant correlation between public spending and social democratic support. In addition,
we find that the magnitude of the relationship between public spending on welfare and social
democratic support is over twice the size of the magnitude of the relationship between total
public spending and social democratic vote shares. This suggests that social democrats
benefitted both from more public sector employment and greater wealth redistribution.
Another key result is the relationship between employment in industry and support for
social democrats. Again, the results lend support for the proposition that industrial workers
have been their core supporters, and hence that the decline in industry since the 1970s is
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Table 4: Correlates of social democratic votes in the era of globalization, 1975-2017
Analysis of levels Analysis of differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Public spending (% of GDP) 0.249* 0.222* 0.229** 0.206
(0.129) (0.122) (0.110) (0.125)
Welfare spending (% of GDP) 0.509** 0.532** 0.839** 0.864**
(0.243) (0.239) (0.318) (0.327)
Employment in industry (%) 0.981*** 0.970** 0.866*** 0.862** 0.147 0.224 0.167 0.207
(0.277) (0.348) (0.274) (0.324) (0.327) (0.334) (0.330) (0.323)
Globalization index 0.027 0.251 0.036 0.226 0.210 0.411 0.179 0.431
(0.350) (0.451) (0.345) (0.428) (0.473) (0.365) (0.477) (0.378)
Social Dem. left-right position 0.102** 0.046 0.100** 0.049 0.029 0.040 0.032 0.040
(0.048) (0.034) (0.048) (0.035) (0.038) (0.026) (0.039) (0.026)
Centre Right left-right position -0.006 0.062 -0.008 0.049 -0.051 -0.024 -0.050 -0.024
(0.051) (0.053) (0.051) (0.055) (0.043) (0.036) (0.042) (0.037)
SD party in gov’t (single-party) -0.347 -0.148 -0.598 -0.524 -3.523** -3.908** -3.456** -3.954**
(1.451) (1.826) (1.431) (1.806) (1.393) (1.428) (1.397) (1.407)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-PM) -0.936 -1.002 -0.791 -1.001 -3.651*** -4.516*** -3.583*** -4.579***
(1.435) (1.304) (1.460) (1.302) (1.093) (1.007) (1.110) (1.027)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-junior) -3.214** -4.703*** -3.233** -5.031*** -3.705*** -5.843*** -3.714*** -5.837***
(1.348) (1.314) (1.348) (1.303) (1.028) (1.152) (1.029) (1.157)
Turnout 0.121 0.072 0.100 0.038 0.313* -0.003 0.309* -0.000
(0.148) (0.157) (0.139) (0.142) (0.171) (0.208) (0.167) (0.207)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year time trends No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 244 193 244 193 227 171 227 171
R-squared 0.223 0.308 0.240 0.335 0.234 0.343 0.239 0.344
Number of countries 27 22 27 22 27 22 27 22
Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1 to 4 estimate effects on the overall level of support
for social democratic parties. Models 5 to 8 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). Controls: union
density, district magnitude, employment in agriculture, women in work, urban population, life expectancy, population (log),
population aged 65 and over, population aged 0 to 14, percent in higher education. Full results in Appendix Table A4.
one of the key reasons for the long-term decline in their support. We find little evidence
that short-term changes in industrial employment affects social democratic support. We
also do not find a relationship between globalization and support for social democrats. But,
we do find a negative relationship between union density and social democratic support,
which runs counter to some existing views about the power of unions and support for wealth
redistribution (e.g. Crouch 2017).
Table 5 shows the results for 1989 to 2017, for the post-Cold War period (1989-2017) and
the post-Great Recession period (2000-17). Again, the public spending variables are signifi-
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Table 5: Correlates of social democratic votes after the Cold War and the Great Recession
Post-Cold War (1989-2017) Post-Great Recession (2000-2017)
Analysis of levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Public spending (% of GDP) 0.269 0.223 0.818** 0.792**
(0.166) (0.153) (0.304) (0.293)
Welfare spending (% of GDP) 0.815** 0.750** 1.900*** 1.873***
(0.385) (0.353) (0.574) (0.493)
Employment in industry (%) 0.628* 1.265** 0.462 1.019** 0.632 1.949* 0.578 1.785*
(0.338) (0.462) (0.375) (0.488) (0.761) (1.001) (0.756) (1.022)
Globalization index 0.373 0.534 0.438 0.711 0.983** 1.118* 1.106** 1.493*
(0.424) (0.475) (0.423) (0.441) (0.366) (0.623) (0.424) (0.753)
Social Democrat left-right position 0.135* 0.054 0.139* 0.059 0.029 0.114 0.035 0.133
(0.072) (0.053) (0.070) (0.050) (0.061) (0.097) (0.064) (0.100)
Centre Right left-right position 0.008 0.069 0.009 0.060 -0.137* -0.006 -0.143** -0.038
(0.052) (0.056) (0.052) (0.060) (0.067) (0.066) (0.064) (0.068)
SD party in gov’t (single-party) -2.967 -2.371 -3.211 -3.010 0.359 -1.581 0.153 -2.269
(2.005) (2.145) (2.078) (2.501) (3.413) (4.283) (3.410) (4.348)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-PM) -0.368 0.307 -0.492 0.033 -1.725 0.334 -1.776 -0.103
(1.444) (1.034) (1.432) (1.088) (1.557) (1.482) (1.548) (1.509)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-junior) -3.425* -4.609** -3.497* -4.983** -4.571** -3.409 -4.757** -4.184*
(1.923) (1.709) (1.971) (1.873) (1.767) (2.103) (1.797) (2.328)
Turnout 0.116 -0.088 0.112 -0.092 -0.007 -0.346 0.011 -0.287
(0.172) (0.191) (0.172) (0.190) (0.245) (0.265) (0.234) (0.239)
Observations 180 141 180 141 107 84 107 84
R-squared 0.204 0.323 0.209 0.341 0.502 0.534 0.505 0.548
Number of countries 27 22 27 22 27 22 27 22
Analysis of differences
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Public spending (% of GDP) 0.281* 0.267* 0.646** 0.644**
(0.139) (0.142) (0.312) (0.313)
Welfare spending (% of GDP) 0.893** 0.918** 1.497** 1.615**
(0.392) (0.382) (0.690) (0.668)
Employment in industry (%) -0.206 0.573 -0.207 0.588 0.354 0.652 0.340 0.565
(0.345) (0.398) (0.343) (0.408) (0.515) (0.725) (0.566) (0.704)
Globalization index -0.035 0.300 -0.031 0.283 0.423 0.281 0.434 0.568
(0.556) (0.464) (0.556) (0.460) (0.487) (0.716) (0.475) (0.723)
Social Democrat left-right position 0.024 0.019 0.028 0.017 -0.037 -0.007 -0.038 -0.008
(0.055) (0.047) (0.056) (0.047) (0.046) (0.080) (0.045) (0.077)
Centre Right left-right position -0.054 0.000 -0.055 0.001 -0.155*** -0.073 -0.155*** -0.076
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.107) (0.048) (0.113)
SD party in gov’t (single-party) -4.958*** -4.183** -5.046*** -4.099* -1.011 -4.025 -1.018 -4.292
(1.705) (1.996) (1.698) (2.016) (2.040) (2.907) (2.065) (2.825)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-PM) -4.042*** -3.780*** -4.053*** -3.793*** -3.515* -2.334 -3.511* -2.597
(1.177) (1.320) (1.175) (1.327) (1.829) (2.037) (1.838) (2.042)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-junior) -4.516*** -5.468*** -4.545*** -5.470*** -4.281* -4.740* -4.282* -4.725*
(1.258) (1.430) (1.243) (1.453) (2.151) (2.690) (2.162) (2.671)
Turnout 0.312 -0.014 0.314 -0.015 0.094 -0.085 0.096 -0.034
(0.210) (0.228) (0.211) (0.228) (0.246) (0.348) (0.243) (0.331)
Observations 170 136 170 136 107 84 107 84
R-squared 0.270 0.333 0.271 0.334 0.452 0.403 0.452 0.415
Number of countries 27 22 27 22 27 22 27 22
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year time trends No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Columns 1 to 8 estimate effects on the overall level of support
for social democratic parties. Columns 9 to 16 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). Controls:
employment in agriculture, district magnitude, women in work, urban population, population (log), population aged 65 and
over, population aged 0 to 14, union density, percent in higher education. Full results in Appendix Table A5.
cant, although this time only the welfare spending variable is significant in all specifications.
In addition, employment in industry is only significant for 1989-2000, not for 2000-2017.
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This suggests that after the 2008 financial crises, industrial workers had not only declined
in numbers, but were now less likely to support social democrats.
Robustness tests: We undertake three robustness tests. First, to test whether our
results depend on our definition of social democratic parties, we estimate the models with
three alternative dependent variables: (1) our social democratic vote share variable, but
counting the Italian Communist Party (PCI) as the social democratic party in Italy from
1968 onwards (instead of the PSI); (2) total left vote share, of all votes for social democrats,
radical left, and other left parties; and (3) centre right vote share, of votes for the mainstream
centre right parties in each country. The results (in Appendix Tables A8 and A9) reveal that
the existing correlation between public spending and social democratic votes is even stronger
for the 1945-2017 period when counting the PCI rather than PSI. We also find that the key
relationships we uncover only hold consistently for social democratic parties but not for all
votes for left parties. Similarly, employment in industry is unrelated to support for the
centre right, although there is some evidence that public spending is related to support for
the centre right in the 1945-2017 period, but not in the 1975-2017 period. In short, only
support for social democratic parties seems closely linked to the size of the manufacturing
and public sectors.
Second, to explore the heterogeneity of the effect, we break down the analysis by region.
Figure A3 in the Appendix shows the pattern of support for social democratic parties in
North-Western Europe, Scandinavia, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe. These figures
show heterogeneity across and within regions, although North Western Europe, Scandinavia
and Southern Europe all show a clear ‘rise and fall’ pattern. We also estimate the models
separately for the 18 Western European and 13 Eastern European cases (in Table A10 in
the Appendix), and for Southern Europe, Scandinavia, and the rest of Western Europe (in
Table A11). The effect of public spending holds for Western Europe and Southern Europe,
but when broken down to the smaller number of cases (in A11), the lack of power reduces
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the significance.
Third, given our attempt to trace the arc of social democracy over a century, issues of
periodizations are crucial. To test whether our results are driven by our choice of periods,
we undertake a sensitivity analysis by randomising when we stop and start the periods we
analyze: so, starting in 1950 rather than 1945, in 1970 or 1980 rather than 1975, and in
1985, 1995 or 2005 instead of 2000 or 1989 or 2000. The results of this analysis (in Appendix
A12, A13, and A14) suggest that our choice of periods in the main analysis has no effect on
our main results.
4 Who Votes for Social Democratic Parties?
The results from this aggregate analysis can only be suggestive of particular relationships
between individual voters and social democratic parties. For the most recent period, though,
we can see whether the aggregate patterns can be observed at the individual-level, using the
European Social Survey (ESS).The eight ESS waves, from 2002 to 2016, cover the period
of the Great Recession (2007-10), the refugee crisis (2015-16), and the decline in support
for social democratic parties. Fourteen countries in our aggregate data are included in all
ESS waves: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.
Following the aggregate results, we focus on the propensity of someone in a manual
job in industry ( manufacturing, construction, or extraction) or who was a public sector
employee (health and social care, education, or public administration and defence) to vote
for a social democratic party. To investigate whether social democratic parties are attracting
new professionals, as Kitschelt (1990) and others have suggested, we also include a measure
of whether someone is a socio-cultural professional (legal services, the media, the creative
industries, and universities) (Oesch 2006). We estimate a linear probability model for each
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wave separately, with country-fixed effects, and we control for a person’s gender, whether
they live in a city or town, and their age.
The results are summarized in the bottom panel of Figure 4 (see Appendix Table A15).
The top panel shows the average percent of employment in manufacturing and the public
sector in the 14 countries at the time of each ESS wave, using Eurostat data. Together,
these data reveal a particular perspective on the decline of the social democratic electoral
coalition. First, while employment in the public sector has remained stable, employment
in industry declined by almost 20 percent in just 12 years (from 24.4 to 21.1 percent of
the workforce). Second, there has been a decline in support for social democratic parties
amongst industrial workers and public sector employees, although public sector employees
remain more likely to vote social democrat than industrial workers. In addition, support
for social democrats amongst socio-cultural professionals has remained stable. This coheres
with Abou-Chadi and Wagner (2019), that social democrats can lose votes if their policies
are opposed by (public sector) trade unions, as well as Piketty’s (2018) view that social
democrats now mainly rely on the support of ‘Brahmins’, who in our measures are public
sector employees and socio-cultural professionals.
In short, in the most recent period, social democratic parties have been hit by a triple
effect: 1) there has been a decline in the size of one of the main groups that have traditionally
supported social democrats (industrial workers); 2) there has been a decline in the propensity
of their core supporters (industrial workers and public sector employees) to vote for them;
and 3) these losses have not been compensated by gains in support amongst the newer
professional classes.
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Figure 4: Industrial workers, public sector employees, and socio cultural professionals, and
social democratic voting
Note: The bottom panel shows the effect of being an industrial worker (extraction, manufacturing, or construction), a public
sector employee, or a socio-cultural professional on voting for a social democratic party. The data are from 8 waves of the
European Social Survey (ESS) for 14 countries: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. The models are estimated with country fixed-effects
and several socio-demographic control variables. The full results are in Appendix Table A14. The top panel shows the percent
of total employment in manufacturing and the public sector in these same 14 countries, from Eurostat
(http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu), using the same measures for manufacturing and public sector employment as in the
ESS.
5 Conclusion
The story of the electoral performance of social democracy over the past century is the story
of the rise and fall of a particular electoral coalition. Social democratic parties emerged
after 1918 to represent the industrial working class. The primary goal of these parties
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was to win an electoral majority and to transform capitalism. This strategy was limited
by the size of this social group, and the fact that not all workers supported socialism.
Only after social democratic parties moderated their policies (moved closer to the median
voter), could the electoral coalition be broadened. By adding another group (public sector
workers) to the coalition, social democratic parties started to win between one-third and a
half of all votes in many countries. This new coalition established social democrats as one
of the main electoral forces in European politics since 1945, on the back of growing public
sector employment. From the 1950s to the 1990s social democracy sought to manage or
moderate capitalism mainly via increasing public spending. Yet, this coalition unravelled in
the 2000s. Globalization and technological change meant that one pillar of this coalition,
industrial workers, was now a relatively small group in most countries. Also, as social
democratic parties tried to appeal to younger, urban professionals, many industrial workers
increasingly supported other parties (such as the populist right or radical left). This left social
democrats relying increasingly on public sector employees. But, with the growing constraints
on public spending after the Great Recession, this was no-longer a winning strategy. Can
social democratic parties build a new electoral coalition? We leave this to others to answer,
and hope our results and our dataset encourage new research in this area.
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6 Appendix 1: Description of the Variables
Centre Right economic left-right position: Economic left-right location of the main
centre right competitor party in the year of the election, as measured by party manifesto
coding. Source: Comparative Manifestos Project data, release 2016b
(https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu).
Centre Right left-right position: Left-right location of the main centre right
competitor party in the year of the election, as measured by party manifesto coding.
Source: Comparative Manifestos Project data, release 2016b.
Centre Right social liberal-authority position: Social left-right location of the main
centre right competitor party in the year of the election, as measured by party manifesto
coding. Source: Comparative Manifestos Project data, release 2016b.
Centre Right vote share: Vote share of the centre right (conservative and Christian
democratic) party/parties (percent) in the election. Source: Nohlen and Stoever (2010),
plus national election commissions. We allocated parties to party families via their
European and international party memberships and existing categorizations, in particular
Von Beyme (1985),Jacobs (1989), and Hix and Lord (1997).
District magnitude (log): Natural log of the electoral system median district magnitude
in the year of the election. Source: Boix (1999), Carey and Hix (2011), the
Constituency-Level Election Archive (CLEA) (http://www.electiondataarchive.org),
and estimated from the size of the legislature.
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Employment in agriculture (percent): Employment in agriculture (as a percent of
total employment) in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development Indicator,
SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS
(http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators).
Employment in industry (percent): Employment in industry (as a percent of total
employment) in the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development Indicator,
SL.IND.EMPL.ZS.
EU member: Country is a member of the ECSC, EEC, or EU in the year of the election.
Source: European Union (https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en).
Eurozone member: Country is a member of the Eurozone in the EU in the year of the
election. Source: European Union
(https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en).
GDP growth: Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the year of the election.
Source: Maddison Project data
(http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm). Corrected to remove
extreme outliers (less than -25 or greater than 25). Missing data entered from closest
source, such as Penn World Tables (http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/pwt.html) or World
Bank Development Indicator, or closest year in Maddison Project data.
GDP per capita (log): Natural log of GDP per capita in the year of the election.
Source: Maddison Project Data (1990 Int. GK dollars). Missing data entered from closest
source, such as Penn World Tables, or World Bank Development Indicator, or closest year
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in Maddison Project data.
Globalization index: KOG Globalization index (https://www.kof.ethz.ch/en/
forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html). Source:
Gygli et al. (2019).
Higher education: Gross enrollment ratio, tertiary, both sexes (percent) in the year of
the election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SE.TER.ENRR.
Inflation: Consumer price inflation (annual percent) in the year of the election. Source:
World Bank Development Indicator, FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG.
Life expectancy: Life expectancy at birth, total (years) in the year of election. Source:
World Bank Development indicator, SP.DYN.LE00.IN.
Manufacturing index: Index of manufacturing production (1953=100), which measures
the volume of trade in manufactured goods in a country relative to 1953. Source: UN
International Trade Statistics, 1900-1960.
Population: Natural log of total population in the year of the election. Source: World
Bank Development indicator, SP.POP.TOTL.
Population aged 0 to 14: Population aged 0 to 14 (percent of the total) in the year of
the election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS.
Population aged 65 and over: Population aged 65 and older (percent of the total) in
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the year of the election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SP.POP.65UP.TO.ZS.
Population growth: Population growth (annual percent change) in the year of the
election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SP.POP.GROW.
Post-tax inequality (GINI): Post-tax and spending income inequality in the year of the
election, as measured by GINI coefficient. Source: Standardized World Income Inequality
Database, version 5.1 (http://fsolt.org/swiid).
Public spending (percent of GDP): Government expenditure in the year of the
election (as a percent of GDP). Source: combined from general government final
consumption expenditure in the year of the election (as a percent of GDP) from the World
Bank Development Indicator (GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZS) and government expenditure in the
year of the election (as a percent of GDP) from Our World in Data
(https://ourworldindata.org/public-spending).
SD economic left-right position: Economic left-right location of social democratic
party in an election, as measured by party manifesto coding. Source: Comparative
Manifestos Project data, release 2016b.
SD party in gov’t (coalition-junior): coded 1 if (at the time of the election) the social
democratic party is in a coalition government, but does not hold the Prime Minister
position. Source:Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus other available sources.
SD party in gov’t (coalition-PM): coded 1 if (at the time of the election) the social
democratic party is in a coalition government, and also holds the Prime Minister position.
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Source:Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus other available sources.
SD party in gov’t (single-party): coded 1 if (at the time of the election) the social
democratic party is in government, and is the only party in the government. Source:Nohlen
and Stoever (2010), plus other available sources.
SD social liberal-authority position: Social left-right location of the social democratic
party in an election, as measured by party manifesto coding. Source: Comparative
Manifestos Project data, release 2016b.
(Semi) Presidential system: Presidential, semi-presidential, or power-sharing regime in
the year of the election. Source: Robert Elgie
(http://www.semi(Semi)Presidentialism.com/?p=1053).
Share of industry in GDP: Share of the industrial sector in gross domestic product,
measured in constant 2011 international-dollars. Source: Timmer et al. (2015).
Social Democrat left-right position: Left-right location of the social democratic party
in an election, as measured by party manifesto coding. Source: Comparative Manifestos
Project data, release 2016b.
Social Democratic party electorate share: Share of total electorate (percent) won by
the social democratic party in the election. Source: Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus
national election commissions.
Social Democratic party vote share: Share of votes (percent) won by the social
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democratic party in the election. Source:Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus national election
commissions.
Total left vote share: Vote share of the social democrats and the radical/ other left
party/parties (percent) in the election. Source: Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus national
election commissions.
Turnout: Turnout (percent) in the election. Source: Nohlen and Stoever (2010), plus
national election commissions.
Unemployment: Unemployment in the year of the election, as a percent of the total
labour force (modelled International Labor Organization (ILO) estimate. Source: World
Bank Development Indicator, SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS.
Union density: Trade union density (measured as the percent of total wage earners who
are trade union members) in the year of the election. Source: ICTWSS: Database on
Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social
Pacts in 51 countries between 1960 and 2014 (http://www.uva-aias.net/en/ictwss).
Urban population: Urban population (as a percent of total population) in the year of
the election. Source: World Bank Development indicator, SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS.
Women in work: Labour force participation rate, female (as a percent of the female
population aged 15 or older), national estimate. Source: World Bank Development
indicator, SL.TLF.CACT.FE.NE.ZS.
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Years of democracy: Number of years of continuous democracy in the year of the
election (POLITY>7), counted from year of first election, and then starting again at 1
following a period of a non-democracy. Source: Polity IV project
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html).
Youth unemployment: Youth unemployment in the year of the election, as a percent of
the labour force aged 15 to 24 (modelled ILO estimate). Source: World Bank Development
Indicator, SL.UEM.1524.ZS.
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7 Appendix 2: Supplementary Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Vote shares of social democratic parties in Western Europe
Note: The lines are estimated by locally weighted scatterplot smoothing.
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Figure A2: Vote shares of social democratic parties in Eastern Europe
Note: The lines are estimated by locally weighted scatterplot smoothing.
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Figure A3: Vote shares of social democratic parties in 4 regions
Note: The lines are estimated by locally weighted scatterplot smoothing. North Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom. Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland, Norway,
Sweden. Southern Europe: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain. Eastern Europe: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
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Table A2: Cases of social democratic parties
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Table A3: Correlates of social democratic party vote shares, 1945-2017
Analysis of levels Analysis of differences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Spending (% of GDP) 0.157** 0.193*** 0.168** 0.163**
(0.058) (0.059) (0.073) (0.073)
Social Democrat left-right position 0.172** 0.170* 0.148** 0.150**
(0.081) (0.084) (0.068) (0.069)
Centre Right left-right position -0.003 -0.003 -0.036 -0.036
(0.036) (0.035) (0.030) (0.030)
District Magnitude 0.574 0.787 0.948 0.912
(1.292) (1.308) (1.596) (1.581)
District mag.*SD left-right position -0.058* -0.055* -0.061** -0.062**
(0.030) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027)
SD party in gov’t (single-party) 1.335 1.097 -3.175*** -3.187***
(1.256) (1.230) (0.957) (0.962)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-PM) 0.976 0.634 -2.507** -2.506**
(1.327) (1.285) (0.963) (0.966)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-junior) -2.849*** -3.056*** -2.461*** -2.451***
(0.912) (0.925) (0.721) (0.721)
Turnout -0.084 -0.086 0.300** 0.299**
(0.106) (0.101) (0.130) (0.129)
GDP per capita (Madison) 3.577 5.310 2.008 2.447
(2.877) (3.238) (2.969) (2.910)
GDP growth (Madison) -0.097 -0.057 -0.166 -0.167
(0.138) (0.145) (0.224) (0.225)
EU member -1.136 -0.385 -1.283 -1.052
(2.055) (2.055) (1.476) (1.572)
Eurozone member 2.646 2.848 -0.082 -0.021
(2.182) (2.112) (1.335) (1.307)
Presidential system 11.214** 10.644** 2.444 2.463
(4.179) (3.886) (4.763) (4.777)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 381 381 353 353
R-squared 0.162 0.176 0.169 0.170
Number of countries 31 31 31 31
Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1 and 2 estimate effects on the overall level of support
for social democratic parties. Models 3 and 4 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). Standard
errors in parentheses.
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Table A4: Correlates of Social Democratic votes in the era of globalization, 1975-2017
Analysis of levels Analysis of differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Public Spending (% of GDP) 0.249* 0.222* 0.229** 0.206
(0.129) (0.122) (0.110) (0.125)
Welfare spending (% GDP) 0.509** 0.532** 0.839** 0.864**
(0.243) (0.239) (0.318) (0.327)
Employment in industry (%) 0.981*** 0.866*** 0.970** 0.862** 0.147 0.167 0.224 0.207
(0.277) (0.274) (0.348) (0.324) (0.327) (0.330) (0.334) (0.323)
Globalization Index 0.027 0.036 0.251 0.226 0.210 0.179 0.411 0.431
(0.350) (0.345) (0.451) (0.428) (0.473) (0.477) (0.365) (0.378)
Social Democrat left-right position 0.102** 0.100** 0.046 0.049 0.029 0.032 0.040 0.040
(0.048) (0.048) (0.034) (0.035) (0.038) (0.039) (0.026) (0.026)
Centre Right left-right position -0.006 -0.008 0.062 0.049 -0.051 -0.050 -0.024 -0.024
(0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.055) (0.043) (0.042) (0.036) (0.037)
SD party in gov’t (single-party) -0.347 -0.598 -0.148 -0.524 -3.523** -3.456** -3.908** -3.954**
(1.451) (1.431) (1.826) (1.806) (1.393) (1.397) (1.428) (1.407)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-PM) -0.936 -0.791 -1.002 -1.001 -3.651*** -3.583*** -4.516*** -4.579***
(1.435) (1.460) (1.304) (1.302) (1.093) (1.110) (1.007) (1.027)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-junior) -3.214** -3.233** -4.703*** -5.031*** -3.705*** -3.714*** -5.843*** -5.837***
(1.348) (1.348) (1.314) (1.303) (1.028) (1.029) (1.152) (1.157)
Turnout 0.121 0.100 0.072 0.038 0.313* 0.309* -0.003 -0.000
(0.148) (0.139) (0.157) (0.142) (0.171) (0.167) (0.208) (0.207)
Union density -0.197 -0.184 -0.457** -0.442** -0.113 -0.106 -0.454* -0.456*
(0.133) (0.132) (0.191) (0.182) (0.147) (0.144) (0.241) (0.245)
Higher education -0.057 -0.017 -0.052 0.014 -0.040 -0.039 -0.177 -0.175
(0.074) (0.079) (0.088) (0.097) (0.129) (0.126) (0.131) (0.131)
Life Expectancy 2.500*** 2.769*** 0.850 1.573** 1.916 1.827 -1.289 -1.310
(0.707) (0.714) (0.639) (0.585) (1.241) (1.221) (1.575) (1.570)
District magnitude (%) 2.033* 1.922* 1.835** 1.667*** 1.071 1.053 1.247 1.233
(1.166) (1.051) (0.667) (0.583) (1.270) (1.219) (0.851) (0.836)
Employment in agriculture 0.490* 0.394 0.543 0.479 0.116 0.135 -1.072** -1.102**
(0.272) (0.259) (0.583) (0.516) (0.306) (0.315) (0.461) (0.481)
Women in work 0.072 0.087 -0.035 -0.010 -0.062 -0.078 -0.218 -0.214
(0.161) (0.155) (0.138) (0.131) (0.168) (0.172) (0.217) (0.223)
Urban population -0.070 -0.030 -0.220 -0.125 -0.324 -0.336 -0.623 -0.624
(0.228) (0.231) (0.256) (0.248) (0.608) (0.615) (0.459) (0.449)
Population (log) -5.476 -6.076 16.241 11.144 -36.827 -45.650 -10.967 -6.510
(12.266) (11.672) (17.767) (15.900) (46.721) (47.695) (47.187) (48.821)
Population aged 65 and over 0.261 0.398 0.939 0.999 -1.306 -1.330 -1.197 -1.210
(0.955) (0.953) (0.923) (0.908) (0.793) (0.836) (0.971) (0.982)
Population aged 0 to 14 -0.018 -0.060 0.380 0.285 1.499 1.575 1.605 1.529
(0.537) (0.554) (0.560) (0.629) (1.047) (1.070) (1.056) (1.103)
Country fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 244 244 193 193 227 227 171 171
R-squared 0.223 0.240 0.308 0.335 0.234 0.239 0.343 0.344
Number of countries 27 27 22 22 27 27 22 22
Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 estimate effects on the overall level of
support for social democratic parties. Models 5, 6, 7, and 8 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences).
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Table A5: Correlates of Social Democratic votes in the era of globalization, 1989-2017
Analysis of levels Analysis of differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Public Spending (% of GDP) 0.269 0.223 0.281* 0.267*
(0.166) (0.153) (0.139) (0.142)
Welfare spending (% GDP) 0.815** 0.750** 0.893** 0.918**
(0.385) (0.353) (0.392) (0.382)
Employment in industry (%) 0.628* 0.462 1.265** 1.019** -0.206 -0.207 0.573 0.588
(0.338) (0.375) (0.462) (0.488) (0.345) (0.343) (0.398) (0.408)
Globalization Index 0.373 0.438 0.534 0.711 -0.035 -0.031 0.300 0.283
(0.424) (0.423) (0.475) (0.441) (0.556) (0.556) (0.464) (0.460)
Social Democrat left-right position 0.135* 0.139* 0.054 0.059 0.024 0.028 0.019 0.017
(0.072) (0.070) (0.053) (0.050) (0.055) (0.056) (0.047) (0.047)
Centre Right left-right position 0.008 0.009 0.069 0.060 -0.054 -0.055 0.000 0.001
(0.052) (0.052) (0.056) (0.060) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
SD party in gov’t (single-party) -2.967 -3.211 -2.371 -3.010 -4.958*** -5.046*** -4.183** -4.099*
(2.005) (2.078) (2.145) (2.501) (1.705) (1.698) (1.996) (2.016)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-PM) -0.368 -0.492 0.307 0.033 -4.042*** -4.053*** -3.780*** -3.793***
(1.444) (1.432) (1.034) (1.088) (1.177) (1.175) (1.320) (1.327)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-junior) -3.425* -3.497* -4.609** -4.983** -4.516*** -4.545*** -5.468*** -5.470***
(1.923) (1.971) (1.709) (1.873) (1.258) (1.243) (1.430) (1.453)
Turnout 0.116 0.112 -0.088 -0.092 0.312 0.314 -0.014 -0.015
(0.172) (0.172) (0.191) (0.190) (0.210) (0.211) (0.228) (0.228)
Union density -0.156 -0.143 -0.662* -0.669* -0.028 -0.025 -0.236 -0.207
(0.160) (0.155) (0.348) (0.336) (0.174) (0.172) (0.452) (0.492)
Higher education 0.011 0.039 -0.105 -0.065 0.023 0.021 -0.113 -0.107
(0.087) (0.094) (0.128) (0.141) (0.139) (0.138) (0.154) (0.153)
District magnitude (%) 3.193** 3.037** 2.501*** 2.341*** 2.119 2.101 1.774*** 1.764**
(1.387) (1.314) (0.703) (0.687) (1.690) (1.653) (0.623) (0.626)
Employment in agriculture 0.443 0.347 0.371 0.251 0.106 0.113 -0.852 -0.918
(0.263) (0.244) (0.849) (0.743) (0.297) (0.299) (0.693) (0.740)
Women in work 0.075 0.096 -0.269 -0.220 -0.056 -0.091 -0.027 0.018
(0.213) (0.222) (0.189) (0.198) (0.305) (0.340) (0.302) (0.355)
Urban population -0.407 -0.292 -0.452 -0.251 -1.071 -0.980 -1.075 -1.178
(0.316) (0.352) (0.419) (0.414) (1.303) (1.388) (1.248) (1.402)
Population (log) 0.091 1.331 36.301* 38.016* -32.993 -28.514 -10.697 -14.727
(16.104) (16.198) (19.970) (19.812) (49.717) (48.114) (52.510) (52.238)
Population aged 65 and over 0.112 0.365 1.045 1.434 -1.987* -1.988* -1.774 -1.809
(0.970) (1.058) (0.938) (1.038) (1.115) (1.118) (1.456) (1.495)
Population aged 0 to 14 0.796 0.886 1.194 1.376 0.450 0.587 1.399 1.288
(0.853) (0.861) (0.825) (0.859) (1.126) (1.185) (1.267) (1.301)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 180 180 141 141 170 170 136 136
R-squared 0.204 0.209 0.323 0.341 0.270 0.271 0.333 0.334
Number of countries 27 27 22 22 27 27 22 22
Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social
democratic parties, Models 5, 6, 7, and 8 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences) Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A6: Correlates of Social Democratic votes in the era of globalization, 2000-2017
Analysis of levels Analysis of differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Public Spending (% of GDP) 0.818** 0.792** 0.646** 0.644**
(0.304) (0.293) (0.312) (0.313)
Welfare spending (% GDP) 1.900*** 1.873*** 1.497** 1.615**
(0.574) (0.493) (0.690) (0.668)
Employment in industry (%) 0.632 0.578 1.949* 1.785* 0.354 0.340 0.652 0.565
(0.761) (0.756) (1.001) (1.022) (0.515) (0.566) (0.725) (0.704)
Globalization Index 0.983** 1.106** 1.118* 1.493* 0.423 0.434 0.281 0.568
(0.366) (0.424) (0.623) (0.753) (0.487) (0.475) (0.716) (0.723)
Social Democrat left-right position 0.029 0.035 0.114 0.133 -0.037 -0.038 -0.007 -0.008
(0.061) (0.064) (0.097) (0.100) (0.046) (0.045) (0.080) (0.077)
Centre Right left-right position -0.137* -0.143** -0.006 -0.038 -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.073 -0.076
(0.067) (0.064) (0.066) (0.068) (0.048) (0.048) (0.107) (0.113)
SD party in gov’t (single-party) 0.359 0.153 -1.581 -2.269 -1.011 -1.018 -4.025 -4.292
(3.413) (3.410) (4.283) (4.348) (2.040) (2.065) (2.907) (2.825)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-PM) -1.725 -1.776 0.334 -0.103 -3.515* -3.511* -2.334 -2.597
(1.557) (1.548) (1.482) (1.509) (1.829) (1.838) (2.037) (2.042)
SD party in gov’t (coalition-junior) -4.571** -4.757** -3.409 -4.184* -4.281* -4.282* -4.740* -4.725*
(1.767) (1.797) (2.103) (2.328) (2.151) (2.162) (2.690) (2.671)
Turnout -0.007 0.011 -0.346 -0.287 0.094 0.096 -0.085 -0.034
(0.245) (0.234) (0.265) (0.239) (0.246) (0.243) (0.348) (0.331)
Union density -1.403*** -1.406*** -1.662*** -1.682*** -0.603* -0.607* -0.305 -0.286
(0.324) (0.318) (0.471) (0.439) (0.326) (0.338) (0.658) (0.664)
Higher education -0.132 -0.129 -0.192 -0.198 -0.153 -0.153 -0.154 -0.117
(0.154) (0.156) (0.175) (0.177) (0.153) (0.156) (0.188) (0.187)
District magnitude (%) 6.667*** 6.795*** 5.831*** 6.178*** 8.456*** 8.463*** 7.998*** 8.005***
(0.696) (0.658) (0.858) (1.010) (0.856) (0.869) (2.681) (2.794)
Employment in agriculture 0.153 0.075 -0.282 -0.529 0.518 0.516 -1.062 -1.083
(0.519) (0.555) (1.308) (1.339) (0.572) (0.575) (1.381) (1.378)
Women in work 0.262 -0.202 -0.571 -0.432 -0.168 -0.166 -0.025 0.154
(0.450) (0.494) (0.473) (0.484) (0.607) (0.611) (0.834) (0.883)
Urban population 0.452 0.660 -0.069 0.333 -2.729 -2.727 -5.336*** -5.408***
(0.861) (0.888) (1.135) (1.140) (2.544) (2.555) (1.876) (1.799)
Population (log) -15.089 -13.923 69.958 76.205* 12.364 12.418 33.798 33.826
(20.793) (20.159) (41.905) (43.486) (65.421) (65.911) (75.560) (81.849)
Population aged 65 and over -1.185 -0.683 0.048 1.235 -0.970 -0.981 -0.229 -0.498
(1.364) (1.956) (1.417) (1.895) (1.871) (1.854) (2.403) (2.282)
Population aged 0 to 14 6.257*** 6.341*** 6.919*** 6.809*** 2.697 2.669 3.208 2.828
(1.321) (1.364) (1.683) (1.582) (2.041) (2.030) (2.306) (2.093)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 107 107 84 84 107 107 84 84
R-squared 0.502 0.505 0.534 0.548 0.452 0.452 0.403 0.415
Number of countries 27 27 22 22 27 27 22 22
Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 estimate effects on the overall level of support for social
democratic parties. Models 5, 6, 7, and 8 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences) Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A7: SD Economic and Social Left Right position over the period 1945 to 2017
Aggregate Sample Non East Europe East Europe
(1) (2) (3)
SD economic left-right position 0.170** 0.0747 0.554**
(0.0712) (0.0471) (0.220)
SD social left-right position 0.156** 0.0829 0.549***
(0.0702) (0.0562) (0.161)
Centre Right economic left-right position 0.0233 0.0494 -0.122
(0.0448) (0.0451) (0.0993)
Centre Right social left-right position -0.0312 -0.0726* 0.0960
(0.0482) (0.0376) (0.118)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country-year effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 386 298 88
R-squared 0.171 0.249 0.457
Number of countries 31 18 13
Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. All models estimate effects on the overall
level of support for social democratic parties. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A8: Robustness tests: social democratic party vote share vs. social democratic,
including the Italian Communist party, vote share vs. total left vote share and vs. centre
right vote share as dependent variables, 1945-2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Soc. Dem. vote share SD with Communist Party Total Left vote share C. Right vote share
Public Spending (% GDP) 0.192*** 0.207*** 0.0843 0.143
(0.0594) (0.0602) (0.0725) (0.0888)
District Magnitude (log) 2.612 3.444*** 2.714** 0.787
(1.652) (1.250) (1.072) (1.110)
Turnout -0.172 -0.162 -0.131 0.0868
(0.107) (0.104) (0.122) (0.144)
GDP per capita (Madison) 6.958** 7.822** 6.560 0.752
(2.928) (2.883) (4.066) (5.049)
GDP growth (Madison) -0.0666 -0.0453 -0.152 0.187
(0.159) (0.157) (0.177) (0.160)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 409 409 409 409
R-squared 0.159 0.188 0.088 0.167
Number of countries 31 31 31 31
Note: Column 1 exhibits estimates for Soc. Dem as in Table 3; Column 2, includes the Italian Communist Party; Column 3
focuses on total left and Column 4 total right. All models are conditional on country Fes, Decade Fes and, progressively,
Country Year Time Trends. Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include regime types, european membership and parties
left and right social and economic position.
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Table A9: Robustness tests: social democratic party vote share vs. total left vote share and
vs. centre right vote share as dependent variables, 1975-2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Soc. Dem. vote share SD with Communist Party Total Left vote share C. Right vote share
Public Spending (% GDP) 0.753*** 0.737*** 0.140 0.202
(0.260) (0.250) (0.352) (0.271)
District Magnitude (log) 0.655** 0.546* -0.114 0.385
(0.313) (0.293) (0.301) (0.336)
Turnout 0.164 0.373 0.198 0.104
(0.400) (0.346) (0.410) (0.476)
GDP per capita (Madison) 0.156 0.126 0.115 -0.0295
(0.118) (0.114) (0.152) (0.155)
GDP growth (Madison) -0.380** -0.391** -0.212 -0.285
(0.177) (0.180) (0.172) (0.288)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 209 209 209 209
R-squared 0.317 0.337 0.160 0.294
Number of countries 22 22 22 22
Note: Column 1 exhibits estimates for Soc. Dem as in Table 3; Column 2, includes the Italian Communist Party; Column 3
focuses on total left and Column 4 total right. All models are conditional on country Fes, Decade Fes and, progressively,
Country Year Time Trends. Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include regime types, european membership and parties
left and right social and economic position.
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Table A10: Heterogeneity Analysis, 1945-2017
Western Europe Eastern Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public spending (% ofGDP) 0.0954* 0.131** 1.167*** 1.343**
(0.0505) (0.0548) (0.370) (0.457)
District magnitude (log) -0.706 -0.534 3.809 3.134
(0.737) (0.744) (4.305) (4.198)
District mag.*SD left-right position -0.00435 -0.00235 0.0338 0.029
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.035) (0.037)
Social democratic party in government 0.572 0.323 -2.536 -2.277
(0.900) (0.805) (1.609) (1.682)
Turnout -0.0093 -0.0084 -0.189 -0.113
(0.117) (0.105) (0.169) (0.202)
GDP per capita (Madison) 2.878 4.506 8.073 3.267
(2.984) (3.729) (4.855) (6.089)
GDP growth (Madison) -0.130 -0.0744 -0.321 -0.379
(0.121) (0.142) (0.358) (0.349)
Eu member -1.079 -0.405 -5.546 -7.264
(2.487) (2.500) (4.046) (4.923)
Presidential system 11.51*** 10.96*** 4.657 5.523
(1.656) (1.631) (7.391) (8.090)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 294 294 87 87
R-squared 0.135 0.150 0.242 0.248
Number of countries 18 18 13 13
Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Columns 1 and 2 estimate effects on the
overall level of support for social democratic parties in Western Europe. Western Europe includes Southern
European and Scandinavian countries. Columns 3 and 4 estimate the overall level of support for SD parties
in Eastern Europe. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A11: Heterogeneity Analysis within Western Europe, 1945-2017
Western Europe Southern Europe Scandinavia
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public spending (% of GDP) 0.119 -0.612** -0.328 0.0284
(0.112) (0.149) (0.293) (0.114)
District magnitude (log) -1.776 -0.239 1.826 2.587
(1.538) (0.563) (1.041) (3.912)
District mag.*SD left-right position 0.0125 0.0614 0.0450 -0.000531
(0.0138) (0.0310) (0.0336) (0.00912)
Social democratic party in government -1.233 0.0705 -0.0491 0.423
(0.841) (1.523) (1.690) (0.424)
Turnout 0.0753 0.549* 0.585 -0.241
(0.154) (0.252) (0.299) (0.149)
GDP per capita (Madison) 12.03** -9.341 -5.258 0.246
(4.172) (12.41) (16.83) (3.709)
GDP growth (Madison) 0.0536 -1.125** -0.842* 0.221
(0.141) (0.257) (0.356) (0.147)
Eu member -4.317** 11.71* 15.38** -1.589
(1.699) (4.672) (4.439) (3.641)
Observations 155 59 59 80
R-squared 0.480 0.576 0.548 0.639
Number of countries 9 5 5 4
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Columns 1 exhibits estimates on the overall level of support for social democratic parties in Western
Europe. Column 2 and 3 focus on Southern Europe. Column 2 studies the effect on SD parties, Column 3
includes the Italian Communist Party. Column 4 focuses on Scandinavian countries. All estimates are
conditional on country fixed effects, decade fixed effects and, progressively, country year specific time
trends. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A12: Randomization, 1950-2017
Post-1950
Analysis of levels Analysis of differences
(1) (2)
Public spending (% of GDP) 0.197** 0.148**
(0.079) (0.066)
Social Democrat left-right position 0.158 0.134**
(0.097) (0.059)
Centre Right left-right position -0.012 -0.034
(0.040) (0.028)
District magnitude (log) 0.139 0.970
(1.537) (1.455)
District mag.*SD left-right position -0.046 -0.056**
(0.035) (0.025)
Social democratic party in government 1.250 -6.392***
(1.175) (1.308)
Turnout (%) -0.123 0.287**
(0.107) (0.122)
Controls Yes Yes
Country fixed-effects Yes Yes
Decade fixed-effects Yes Yes
Country-year time trends Yes Yes
Observations 381 353
R-squared 0.176 0.170
Number of countries 31 31
Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Column 1 estimates effects on the overall level of support for
social democratic parties, whereas Column 2 estimates changes in support between elections (first differences). The estimates
replicate Table 3, but with a different time period, from 1950 onwards. Standard errors in parentheses. Results not shown for
the constant and the control variables: GDP per capita (log), GDP growth, EU member, Eurozone member, presidential
system.
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Table A13: Randomization, 1970-2017 and 1980-2017
Post-1970 Post-1980
Analysis of levels Analysis of differences Analysis of levels Analysis of differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Public spending (% of GDP) 0.205* 0.225* 0.110 0.200
(0.105) (0.112) (0.121) (0.146)
Welfare spending (% of GDP) 0.613** 0.794** 0.675** 0.794**
(0.238) (0.362) (0.241) (0.362)
Employment in industry (%) 0.841*** 0.810** 0.201 0.267 0.766** 0.939** 0.152 0.267
(0.241) (0.307) (0.338) (0.388) (0.345) (0.355) (0.390) (0.388)
Globalization index 0.030 0.211 0.261 0.455 0.093 0.263 0.297 0.455
(0.327) (0.437) (0.488) (0.426) (0.362) (0.447) (0.496) (0.426)
Social Democrat left-right position 0.078 0.048 0.008 0.018 0.105** 0.049 0.019 0.018
(0.048) (0.035) (0.036) (0.030) (0.050) (0.040) (0.038) (0.030)
Centre Right left-right position 0.002 0.053 -0.052 -0.023 0.002 0.050 -0.054 -0.023
(0.048) (0.055) (0.042) (0.043) (0.055) (0.056) (0.043) (0.043)
Social dem. party in government -1.675 -2.748** -3.475** -3.293** -3.071** -3.163** -3.960** -3.293**
(1.040) (1.280) (1.307) (1.523) (1.109) (1.350) (1.557) (1.523)
Turnout (%) 0.110 0.039 0.350** 0.202 0.041 -0.008 0.363** 0.202
(0.136) (0.144) (0.160) (0.210) (0.146) (0.168) (0.172) (0.210)
Union Density -0.192 -0.463** -0.120 -0.436 -0.183 -0.517** -0.125 -0.436
(0.116) (0.191) (0.144) (0.292) (0.140) (0.214) (0.161) (0.292)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 244 193 244 193 227 171 227 171
R-squared 0.223 0.308 0.240 0.335 0.234 0.343 0.239 0.344
Number of countries 27 22 27 22 27 22 27 22
Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 estimate effects on the overall level of
support for social democratic parties, whereas Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 estimate changes in support between elections (first
differences). Estimates replicate Table 4, but with a different time period. Precisely, Columns 1 to 4 perform the analysis
from 1970 onwards, whereas Columns 5 to 8 do so from 1980 onwards. Standard errors in parentheses. Results not shown for
the constant, and the control variables: employment in agriculture, women in work, urban population, life expectancy,
population (log), population aged 65 and over, population aged 0 to 14, percent in higher education.
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Table A14: Randomization, 1985-2017, 1995-2017, and 2005-2017
Post-1985 Post-1995 Post-2005
Analysis of levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public spending (% of GDP) 0.223 0.505** 0.746*
(0.151) (0.209) (0.396)
Public spending on social welfare (% of GDP) 0.905*** 1.032** 0.843
(0.239) (0.381) (0.786)
Employment in industry (%) 0.627* 1.007** 0.547 1.033 0.428 1.507
(0.354) (0.447) (0.548) (0.630) (1.549) (1.862)
Globalization index 0.248 0.475 0.930*** 0.984** -0.608 -2.814
(0.410) (0.421) (0.212) (0.473) (0.994) (2.442)
Social Democrat left-right position 0.112 0.033 0.116* 0.128* 0.052 0.007
(0.068) (0.050) (0.062) (0.062) (0.066) (0.104)
Centre Right left-right position 0.007 0.075 -0.123** 0.007 -0.186*** 0.021
(0.057) (0.054) (0.051) (0.068) (0.048) (0.132)
Social democratic party in government -2.833* -3.292* -2.289* -2.743 -2.714 0.260
(1.424) (1.615) (1.322) (1.752) (2.694) (2.781)
Turnout (%) 0.083 -0.073 -0.004 -0.147 0.171 0.650
(0.166) (0.167) (0.179) (0.219) (0.206) (0.532)
Observations 201 162 141 111 73 58
R-squared 0.171 0.340 0.496 0.471 0.474 0.504
Number of countries 27 22 27 22 27 22
Analysis of differences
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Public spending (% of GDP) 0.297* 0.661** 0.484
(0.156) (0.250) (0.439)
Public spending on social welfare (% of GDP) 0.873** 1.756*** -0.269
(0.399) (0.528) (1.036)
Employment in industry (%) -0.104 0.666 0.289 1.084* -0.992 -0.909
(0.363) (0.467) (0.452) (0.536) (0.870) (1.354)
Globalization index 0.073 0.342 -0.270 0.460 -0.095 -0.027
(0.530) (0.488) (0.748) (0.597) (1.198) (1.373)
Social Democrat left-right position 0.006 0.002 0.006 -0.005 -0.086 0.051
(0.047) (0.036) (0.066) (0.055) (0.079) (0.144)
Centre Right left-right position -0.058 -0.010 -0.110* -0.016 -0.155* -0.065
(0.046) (0.041) (0.054) (0.079) (0.086) (0.170)
Social democratic party in government -4.432*** -3.420* -3.559** -4.119* -9.589*** -8.585***
(1.590) (1.807) (1.404) (2.214) (2.559) (2.724)
Turnout (%) 0.349* 0.164 0.295 0.065 0.344 0.067
(0.189) (0.221) (0.221) (0.278) (0.230) (0.375)
Observations 191 157 139 107 73 58
R-squared 0.207 0.206 0.258 0.337 0.573 0.560
Number of countries 27 22 27 22 27 22
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: social democratic party vote share. Models 1 to 6 estimate effects on the overall level of support
for social democratic parties, whereas models 7 to 12 estimate changes in support between elections (first differences). The
estimates replicate Table 5, but with a different time period. Precisely, Columns 1, 2, 7, and 8 perform the analysis for a
period just before the end of the Cold-War, whereas Columns 3, 4, 9, and 10 for a period just after the end of it. Columns 5,
6, 11, and 12 perform the analysis for a period just after the Great Recession. Standard errors in parentheses. Results not
shown for the constant and the control variables: employment in agriculture, women in work, urban population, population
(log), population aged 65 and over, population aged 0 to 14, union density, percent in higher education.
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Table A15: Individual-level correlates of voting or a social democratic party
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ESS Waves 1-2002 2-2004 3-2006 4-2008 5-2010 6-2012 7-2014 8-2016
Worker in industry 0.0311** 0.0392** 0.0386** 0.0303** 0.0122 0.0204 0.0209* 0.0189*
(0.0107) (0.0132) (0.0137) (0.0129) (0.0122) (0.0150) (0.0117) (0.00885)
Public sector employee 0.0784*** 0.0862*** 0.0646*** 0.0805*** 0.0790*** 0.0632*** 0.0664*** 0.0583***
(0.0158) (0.0187) (0.0146) (0.0130) (0.0115) (0.0121) (0.00976) (0.00992)
Socio- cultural professional 0.0241* 0.0208 0.0352 0.0291* 0.0131 0.0402* 0.0261** 0.0245*
(0.0126) (0.0142) (0.0200) (0.0145) (0.0135) (0.0188) (0.0121) (0.0115)
Male 0.0108 0.00461 0.00101 -0.00188 0.00287 0.00502 0.00177 -0.00436
(0.00640) (0.00664) (0.00732) (0.00456) (0.00671) (0.00586) (0.00429) (0.00538)
Lived in a city 0.0205 0.0106 0.0415*** 0.0214** 0.0350*** 0.0264** 0.0231* 0.0359**
(0.0117) (0.00644) (0.0117) (0.00982) (0.00893) (0.00933) (0.0113) (0.0124)
Lives in a town 0.0186* 0.0236*** 0.0292*** 0.0273*** 0.0168 0.0144 0.0172*** 0.0120
(0.00934) (0.00764) (0.00866) (0.00581) (0.00976) (0.0105) (0.00452) (0.00833)
Age 0.00260*** 0.00255*** 0.00220*** 0.00269*** 0.00247*** 0.00266*** 0.00258*** 0.00252***
(0.000289) (0.000374) (0.000238) (0.000294) (0.000212) (0.000273) (0.000250) (0.000287)
Observations 28,686 27,843 28,603 29,049 27,428 28,921 26,947 24,668
R-squared 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.021 0.020 0.022 0.023 0.023
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 14
Note: Dependent variable: vote for a social democratic party. Estimation: Linear probability model with country fixed-effects.
Baselines: female, lives in a rural area, other professional and socio-economic status. Data from the 8 waves of the European
Social Survey. Countries included: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Standard errors in parentheses.
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